Several proponents of the interventionist theory of causation have recently argued for a neo-Russellian account of causation. The paper discusses two strategies for interventionists to be neo-Russellians. Firstly, I argue that the open systems argument -the main argument for a neo-Russellian account advocated by interventionists -fails. Secondly, I explore and discuss an alternative for interventionists who wish to be neo-Russellians: the statistical mechanical account. Although the latter account is an attractive alternative, it is argued that interventionists are not able to adopt it straightforwardly. Hence, to be neo-Russellians remains a challenge to interventionists.
5 As these philosophers point out, causation is often characterized by these features not only in ordinary discourse but also in special science discourse. In this respect it is misleading to call the notion of causation a 'folk' notion. However, I will adopt the term 'folk features' of causation, as it is an established and useful term in the debate. 6 Time-symmetry is often understood in terms of time-reversal invariance in the sense that if the fundamental laws permit a sequence $ of states of a physical system S 1 (t 1 ), …, S n (t n ), then they also permit the temporally reversed sequence $ # of states S # n (t n ), …, S # 1 (t 1 ). See Albert (2000, 2-9) , Earman (2002) , North (2008) , and Arntzenius and Greaves (2009) for a detailed discussion of interpretation of time-reversal invariance in various branches of physics.
true, then the following interventionist counterfactuals have to be true: 'if there were an intervention I = i on X such that X = x, then Y = y would be the case', and 'if there were an intervention I = i* on X such that X = x*, then Y = y* would be the case' (with i≠i*, x≠x*, y≠y*). An intervention on X is, roughly speaking, defined as a cause of X that exclusively influences X and any change of Y due to the intervention on X is mediated through X (Woodward 2003, 98) . Moreover, Woodward requires that interventions be merely logically -not physically -possible (2003, 128, 132) . This modal character of interventions is going to matter for the discussion in this section.
Woodward's interventionist theory of causation is conceptually non-reductive because it refers to interventions, which are explicitly introduced as causal notions. 8 Woodward is not concerned with the methodology of causation, i.e. the construction of algorithms that allow us to infer causal models from statistical data (Woodward 2003, 38) . 9 The aim of interventionists is to provide a semantic account of causal statements.
Woodward is very explicit about the semantic goal of his approach: "my aim is to give an account of the content or meaning of various locutions, such as X causes Y […]" (Woodward 2003, 38; cf. also 2003, 7-9; 2008, 194-196) . 8 One might worry that conceptually non-reductive explications of causation are viciously circular (Strevens 2007, 245) . This is a serious challenge to interventionism. However, I will not address this problem here and suppose, for the sake of the argument, that this kind of circularity is not vicious as the proponents of the non-reductive explication argue (Woodward 2003, 104-107) . 9 "By contrast [to Pearl's and Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines's work], I have nothing to say about issues having to with calculating quantitative magnitudes, estimation, identifiability, or causal inference. Instead, my enterprise is, roughly, to provide an account of the meaning or content of just those qualitative causal notions that Pearl (and perhaps Spirtes et al.) take as primitive. Because my project is semantic or interpretative, and is not intended as a contribution to practical problems of causal inference […] ." (Woodward 2003, 38) The basic idea of the OSA draws on the interventionist theory of causation as follows: (a) causal relations are not part of the ontology of fundamental physics because it is impossible to intervene on the systems described by fundamental physics (i.e. the interventionist theory of causation does not apply). (b) Higher-level causal facts obtain since it is possible to intervene on those kinds of systems that are described by the special sciences. According to proponents of the OSA, the possibility to intervene on a system depends on whether the system is open or closed (I will return to the distinction between open and closed systems shortly). Therefore, Woodward argues, the OSA provides a reason to believe that the orthodox Russellian claim and the neo-Russellian claim are both true.
Hence, the Neo-Russellian challenge is resolved. If the OSA were sound, it would be a great success for interventionists, because the orthodox Russellian claim and the neoRussellian claim would follow straightforwardly from the interventionist account of causation. However, I argue that the argument is not sound.
Let me now present the OSA in detail. Several interventionists who agree on the OSA are inspired by a claim by Judea Pearl (cf. Eagle 2007, 171; Hitchcock 2007, 53-54; Woodward 2007, 92-93) 10 :
If you wish to include the entire universe in the model, causality disappears because interventions disappear -the manipulator and the manipulated lose their distinction.
However scientists rarely consider the entirety of the universe as an object of investigation. In most cases the scientist carves a piece from the universe and proclaims that piece in -namely the focus of investigation. The rest of the universe is then considered out or background and is summarized by what we call boundary 10 See also Price and Weslake (2009, section 6.3) .
conditions. This choice of ins and outs creates asymmetry in the way we look at things, and it is this asymmetry that permits us to talk about 'outside intervention' and hence about causality and cause-effect directionality. (Pearl 2000, 349f) The explanatory targets in this quote are specific features of causality, most importantly the features of causal asymmetry and causal time-asymmetry. The notion of an 'outside intervention' apparently plays the key role in this explanation. So, what is the argument that Neo-Russellian interventionists advocate and which is inspired by Pearl? Let me focus on Woodward's OSA because it is the most elaborated version of the argument, and, further, because Eagle's and Hitchcock's formulations of the OSA seem to be in agreement with Woodward's OSA.
Woodward observes that the special sciences typically do not only use causal vocabulary. Moreover, the kinds of systems that these sciences describe by means of causal claims exhibit a common feature: special science systems typically are a small part of the entire world (as indicated in the quote by Pearl). Special science systems are open systems, as they are not isolated from the influence of their environment. By contrast, Woodward holds that the systems described by fundamental physics are global and closed because physical theories describe states of the entire universe.
11 Woodward argues that the successful application of causal notions is explained by the fact that special science systems are " non-global", "small", or "open" (cf. Woodward 2007, 91-92) because "such systems are typically only a small part of a much larger world or environment which is outside the scope of the inquirer's interest but which can serve as source of interventions" (Woodward 2007, 90) . Woodward claims that the existence of possible interventions (as assumed in his account of causation) requires open systems (Woodward 2007, 92) . If the possibility to intervene requires a larger environment outside of a system, he continues, then including the whole universe in a model (as he supposes physicists do) leaves no room for interventions. In other words, there is no room for the "potential source" of interventions in the case of closed systems. Given the interventionist theory of causation is true, which requires the possibility to intervene, Woodward argues, causal notions are not applicable to closed systems (Woodward 2007, 93) . Putting all the pieces together, Woodward's OSA works as follows:
The Open Systems Argument (OSA) To take Woodward's own example, imagine a universe in which the motion of particles is governed by Newtonian mechanics (Woodward 2007, 93) . The laws of this universe are deterministic, global and complete in the sense that, given some state of the entire universe S 1 at time t 1 , the laws determine the state of the entire universe at any other past and future time. Let us assume that a state of the entire universe S 1 at t 1 is the cause of a distinct entire state of the universe S 2 at a later time t 2 . According to the interventionist account, S 1 (t 1 ) is a cause of S 2 (t 2 ) iff, roughly, there is a possible intervention on S 1 (t 1 ) that eventually changes S 2 (t 2 ). Woodward often expresses the right-hand-side of the biconditional in the form of an interventionist counterfactual: 'if it were the case that an intervention occurs such that S 1 *(t 1 ), then it would be the case that S 2 *(t 2 )'; S 1 * is a counterfactual state at t 1 and S 2 * is a counterfactual state at t 2 . In the framework of standard possible worlds semantics, this interventionist counterfactual is true iff S 2 *(t 2 ) is the case in the closest S 1 *(t 1 )-worlds. It is natural to think that, for interventionists, the closest antecedent-worlds are those in which the antecedent is the outcome of an intervention.
What could such an intervention be? For instance, the velocity of a particle is changed by the intervention event i in a possible Newtonian world w. Such an intervention event i could be the influence of an 'additional' counterfactual particle that does not exist in the actual universe. That is, the intervention on a closed system can be understood as a possible world, in which a hypothetical environment (including the 'additional' particle) interacts with a system that is actually closed, i.e. a system that has no environment in the actual world (Woodward's universe). I see no reason why such an intervention should be logically impossible (albeit maybe physically impossible) -and that is all Woodward requires. Prima facie, a world like w is -apart from intervention-event i -very close to the actual Newtonian universe, because its history before the intervention matches the actual history, the same Newtonian laws obtain after the intervention, etc. (if these criteria are used to measure closeness). Moreover, we have a good reason to think that the counterfactual in question is true in Woodward's Newtonian world, because the world w is governed by deterministic laws and a counterfactual state S 1 * at t 1 evolves -in virtue of the deterministic laws -into a counterfactual state S 2 * at t 2 .
I anticipate a concern at this point. One might worry that referring to possible worlds semantics in order to understand Woodward's account of causation is wrongheaded, because Woodward explicitly rejects Lewis's possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals (Woodward 2003, 133-145 (Woodward 2003 , 135-136, Woodward & Hitchcock 2003 . 13 The main point I would like to stress is that using standard possible worlds semantics in order to understand A proponent of the OSA could counter with the following rejoinder to the objection that interventions on closed systems are possible: it is a matter of metaphysical necessity that the actual universe is closed, because it is essentially constituted by the entities, of which it actually consists. So, if one 'added' an intervention-event i to the actual universe it would no longer be the same entity. In virtue of metaphysical necessity there is no intervention on the entity called 'the actual universe', because intervention-worlds would constitute another object that is not identical with the actual universe. However, even if this 12 Woodward's worlds should be understood as model worlds or small worlds, i.e. assignments of values to variables in a causal model (Pearl 2000, 207) . In this respect, Woodwardian worlds differ from Lewisian worlds because the latter are as detailed and concrete as the real spatio-temporal entity we inhabit (Hüttemann 2004, 113) . 13 For a more elaborate discussion of this point, including details of measures of closeness, and a discussion of other semantics for counterfactuals such as Goodmanian and suppositionalist approaches, cf. Reutlinger (2013: chs. 3 & 8) . The arguments in this paper do not depend on any particular choice of semantics.
were the case, one could still maintain that a counterfactual universe w which is in the state S 1 * at t 1 is similar enough -relative to the preferred interventionist measure of closenessto the actual universe (though a different entity) in order to evaluate the counterfactual 'if it were the case that S 1 *(t 1 ), then S 2 *(t 2 ) would be the case'. Although this is a possible rejoinder, I doubt that most interventionists would be comfortable with endorsing claims about the essences of things.
This second objection raises the question whether Woodward is mistaken and there is, in fact, causation in closed systems, if interventions on closed systems are possible. If this were true, then it seems that the orthodox Russellian claim would be false. However, the third objection suggests that this is not the case.
Third Objection
According to the second objection, there is not a good reason to believe that it is (logically) non-a were the case at t 1 , then non-c would be the case at a later time t 2 ' and the backtracking counterfactual 'if non-c at t 2 were the case, then non-a would be the case at t 1 '. Elga claims that if one selects the closest antecedent-worlds of both conditionals in virtue of being small miracle worlds, both counterfactuals are evaluated as true. What is the argument supporting this claim? The argument rests on the premise that is shared by neoRussellians: the dynamical fundamental laws of physics are time-symmetric. Elga argues that the closest antecedent-worlds for the non-backtracking counterfactual are like this: a small miracle occurs shortly before the antecedent-event non-a. The non-backtracking counterfactual is true if the small miracle leading to non-a at t 1 leads to non-c occurs at t 2 (instead of the actual event c) by 'running' the time-symmetric dynamical fundamental laws forward in time. This is just the kind of result Lewis desires.
However, Elga shows that the backtracking counterfactual is also evaluated as true because the closest antecedent-world is a small miracle world. According to Elga, the closest worlds for the backtracking counterfactuals are worlds in which a small miracle occurs shortly after the consequent-event c -at t 3 . The backtracking counterfactual is true if -by running the time-symmetric laws backwards in time from the miracle at t 3 on -the resulting course of events in the past of non-c differs from the actual past of c, i.e. non-a is the case at t 1 . 14 Hence, the backtracking counterfactual can be evaluated as true, if the closest antecedent worlds merely required to be small miracle worlds. Elga draws the conclusion that "in this case there is no asymmetry of miracles, and hence in this case
Lewis's analysis fails to yield the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence" (Elga 2001, 321f.) An analogous argument can be directed against the attempt to establish the timeasymmetry of counterfactuals and -since Woodward's theory of causation is linked to interventionist counterfactuals -causation by relying on interventions. Consider
Woodward's own example of a Newtonian universe (see second objection) to see why this is the case. Suppose that S 1 *(t 1 ) is a counterfactual state of the universe that is the effect of a future-directed intervention that occurred at an earlier time t 0 (and assume further that the history of the universe prior to the intervention at t 0 is fixed). Accordingly, the counterfactual 'if it were the case that S 1 *(t 1 ), then S 2 *(t 2 ) would be the case' is true if, in the closest worlds, S 1 *(t 1 ) is the result of the future directed intervention and -by running the laws forward in time -the universe evolves into the state S 2 * at t 2 . The reason why we consider this counterfactual to be true is firmly tied to the assumption that interventions can only influence the future of Woodward's universe.
However, if we drop the assumption that the interventions may only have a futuredirected time-asymmetric influence -in order to avoid the first objection -the picture drastically changes. Analogously to Elga's argument and in accord with Woodward's example, the fundamental dynamical laws governing the Newtonian universe are timesymmetric. Once we introduce synchronic or backwards interventions, the time-symmetric laws governing Woodward's universe allow that the following backtracking counterfactual is true: 'if it were the case that S 2 *(t 2 ), then S 1 *(t 1 ) would be the case'. 15 By analogy with Elga's argument, let us assume that S 2 *(t 2 ) is the result of either a synchronic intervention at t 2 or of a backwards intervention at t 3 (and we assume that the future of the universe later than t 2 , or respectively at t 3 , is held fixed). Then we run the time-symmetric laws governing Woodward's Newtonian universe backwards from state S 2 * at t 2 to the earlier state of the universe at t 1 . The backtracking counterfactual is true if the state at t 1 is S 1 *. If we do not already build a time-direction into the interventions, then we ought to accept that the counterfactual state S 2 *(t 2 ) evolves -by running the time-symmetric dynamical laws backwards in time -into a counterfactual state S 1 *(t 1 ) that differs from the actual state S 1 at
The upshot is that if the analogy to Elga's argument holds, then -contrary to the proponents of the OSA -it is possible to intervene on a closed system (such as Woodward's Newtonian universe) and it is not the case that time-asymmetric causal facts obtain with respect to this system. Therefore, the mere possibility to intervene fails to warrant a causal interpretation of interventionist counterfactuals and is, hence, insufficient for supporting the neo-Russellian claim and the orthodox Russellian claim.
Fourth Objection
It is worth noting that Pearl argues from a methodological point of view. Pearl's primary project is to develop algorithms to infer causal models from statistical data. In contrast to this methodological project, the interventionists pursue a semantic project: they aim at clarifying the truth-conditions of causal statements. If one cares about the (experimental)
evidence for a causal statement and the methodology of inferring causal models, then the claim gains plausibility that the investigator has to be outside of the system that the causal statement in question is about. Especially, if intervening is an important part of one methodology of constructing causal models, then Pearl's claim that "causality disappears because interventions disappear -the manipulator and the manipulated lose their distinction" (Pearl 2000, 350) makes sense. However, even if Pearl's methodological claim were justified, it does not follow that the claim is also justified for regarding semantic project.
Summing up section 2, I conclude that the OSA is not a sound way for interventionists to meet the neo-Russellian challenge. The next section explores a potential alternative for interventionists.
An Alternative: the Statistical Mechanical Account
There is an alternative strategy for interventionists to argue for the neo- OSA. Prima facie, this argument seems to be useful for interventionists who do not want to rely on the OSA.
The basic idea of the SM account is that higher-level causal facts are physically kosher, because they can be explained by the fundamental time-symmetric dynamical laws plus additional non-causal assumptions. According to the SM account, the existence of (time-asymmetric) higher-level causal facts can be explained by the same set of premises that explains the macro-physical time-asymmetric behavior that is described by the second law of thermodynamics. In order to understand the SM-account of causation, let me first introduce the explanation of the second law of thermodynamics (henceforth, referred to as 'the second law').
Building on the original idea by Ludwig Boltzmann, the explanation of the timeasymmetric second law is, most importantly, based on the time-symmetric laws of classical mechanics, the so-called past-hypothesis (PH), and a statistical postulate (PROB). The second law is a paradigmatic example of a time-asymmetric special science law for which such an explanation is available and this explanation relies on time-symmetric fundamental laws of motion. A seminal formulation of the second law is:
The total entropy of the world (or of any isolated subsystem of the world), in the course of any possible transformation, either keeps at the same value or goes up.
(Albert 2000, 32)
The behavior of physical systems described by the second law is not time-symmetric, because the second law -taken literally -does not permit a transition from higher entropy states at a later time t 2 to a state of lower entropy at the earlier time t 1 . The second law is a time-asymmetric physical macro-law.
According to the SM account (cf. Albert 2000, 96; Kutach 2007, 329-331; Loewer 2007, 298-304; Loewer 2009, 156-158) , the time-asymmetric second law can be derived from the following premises:
1. (LAWS) the time-symmetric dynamical laws of fundamental physics 17 , 2. (PH) a proposition that the initial macro state of the universe was a state of low entropy, and 3. (PROB) the assumption that there is a uniform probability distribution over the physically possible initial microstates of the universe compatible with PH (that is, the physically possible realizers of the initial macro state referred to in PH).
To be more precise, according to the SM account, these premises entail that it is highly probable (though not certain) that macroscopic systems evolve time-asymmetrically in accord with the second law. At first glance it might appear puzzling how a time-asymmetric law can be explained by the means of time-symmetric fundamental laws. According to the fundamental laws, the sequence from lower entropy (at t 1 ) to higher entropy (at t 2 ) could be time-reversed. Naturally, the fundamental laws by themselves cannot explain the timeasymmetry of the macro-law. The crucial explanatory import is due to the existence of a special initial macro-condition (PH) and the uniform probability distribution (PROB) over the realizers of this macro-condition. This is a highly interesting result because (a) the SM account provides an explanation of the second law, and (b) the SM account reconciles the claim that there are acausal time-symmetric laws on the fundamental level and the claim that there are time-asymmetric laws on the (physical) macro-level. Now, the crucial question is: can the SM account also be used for explaining the existence of time-asymmetric higher-level causal facts? Proponents of the SM account suggest that the answer is 'yes' (cf. Albert 2000, 128-130; Kutach 2007, 338-342; Loewer 2009, 160 it would be the case that non-e'. The truth of this counterfactual requires that there is in principle an 'SM argument' to the conclusion that the probability the non-c(t 0 ) is followed by non-e(t 1 ) is very high. In this cases, the SM argument for the conclusion non-e(t 1 ) has the following premises:
This is a Goodmanian way of stating truth-conditions of counterfactuals in the SMframework, because counterfactuals are nothing but 'condensed' SM arguments (cf.
Goodman 1983, chapter 1). Albert seems to prefer this reading, when he states the truthconditions of counterfactuals by deriving the consequent from the antecedent by "normal procedures of inference" (Albert 2000, 128-130) . The latter amount to what I call the actual availability or, at least, the mere existence of an SM argument (cf. Albert 2000, 96, 129; cf. Loewer 2007, 317; Kutach 2007, 338-342 , for alternative SM-based semantics for counterfactuals). By contrast, given the premises of the SM argument, the probability of the time-reversed sequence -that is, non-e(t 1 ) evolves into non-c(t 0 ) -is extremely low, although it is physically possible.
If there is, at least in principle, an SM account for every causal fact, then causation is physically kosher. Another way to formulate the SM account is that causal facts supervene on the history of the actual world which is constrained by acausal (nomic) facts such as (LAWS), (PH), and (PROB). 19 This supervenience base for causal facts is kosher with respect to fundamental physics (given that the orthodox Russellian claim is true of fundamental physics). Most strikingly for our purposes, a proponent of the SM account does not deny that the dynamical fundamental laws are time-symmetric -rather she claims that non-fundamental causal facts obtain in virtue of the time-symmetric laws, specific initial conditions and PROB. 20 This metaphysical interpretation is in accord with 19 It does not matter for the problem at hand whether acausal nomic facts reduce to acausal particular facts, as Humean Neo-Russellians, such as Loewer, hold. 20 Loewer (2007 Loewer ( , 2009 argues that (PH) should be regarded as a law according to the best systems account of laws. (PH) is law, according to Loewer, because adding (PH) to a deductive system optimizes its simplicity and strength (cf. Roberts 2008, 20-24, for objections). However, it does not matter for the goal of this paper whether Loewer is correct about the lawhood of (PH). The crucial point is that Loewer and other NeoRussellians who use the SM account believe that the fundamental dynamical laws (be they To sum up, the SM-account reconciles (1) the orthodox Russellian claim, (2) the neo-Russellian claim, and (3) the dependence claim. Thus, the SM account meets the neoRussellian challenge. The crucial question is now whether the SM account is a viable alternative for interventionists. I turn to this question in the next section.
Newton's laws of motion, Einstein's field equations, or the Schrödinger equation) are noncausal because they are time-symmetric.
Is the SM Account Really an Alternative for Interventionists?
Suppose you are an interventionist, you accept the neo-Russellian challenge, and you are convinced by the SM account and its ability to support the neo-Russellian claim. You seem to be in an awkward position: on the one hand, the interventionist theory of causation is conceptually non-reductive (because it analyzes causal notions such as 'direct cause' in terms of other causal notions such as 'intervention'). On the other hand, the SM account provides a reductive metaphysics of causation, because it grounds the higher-level causal facts of the special sciences in acausal facts such as (LAWS), (PH), and (PROB). The crucial question for interventionist who are attracted to the SM account is whether a conceptually non-reductive theory is incompatible with a reductive metaphysics of causation. Well, it depends. To be precise, whether the SM account is an option for interventionists depends on how they view the relationship between semantics and metaphysics. Unfortunately, this relationship is highly controversial in the philosophy of causation and in metaphysics in general. It is also not transparent how interventionists think of this relationship. I will present and discuss three ways of viewing this relationship.
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First Option: Identification. Woodward (2008, 193-196) insists that he does not pursue a metaphysical project. Instead, he argues, the interventionist theory is solely dedicated to a conceptual and semantic project: it explicates causal notions used in the 21 Strevens (2007: 246) suggests a fourth option -a "two-factor semantics" inspired by Putnam's work. I will not discuss this option (and Strevens's objections to it) because, as Strevens correctly observes, adopting two-factor semantics implies that the interventionist account is an epistemic account of causation. Similarly, I omit alternative accounts of meaning that do not rely on truth-conditional semantics, such as accounts of meaning in terms of acceptability or testability conditions. These accounts require more radical departures from Woodward's actual intuitions about meaning. However, this does not imply that it is impossible (or even unattractive) to frame an interventionist theory in terms of, say, acceptability conditions. (Sider) . What they are looking for when they talk about the metaphysics of causation is how (and whether) causation is grounded by fundamental entities (Fine, Sider) or located in the fundamental structure of the world (Sider) . Schaffer most prominently defends the view that a non-reductive analysis is compatible with a reductive (in his case, Humean) metaphysics of causation (cf. Schaffer 2004, 308; 2008, 87) .
Suppose Woodward would (a) adopt the stance of heavy-weight metaphysics and (b) maintain that he is devoted to a semantic project. This meta-metaphysical view enables
Woodward to avoid the objection that interventionism qua semantic project is incompatible with a Neo-Russellian reductive metaphysics of causation. It is a consequence of this metametaphysical view that the interventionist theory itself (as a semantic enterprise) is simply not suited to deal with the metaphysical problem that Russell and the Neo-Russellians raise, because providing truth-conditions does not answer the question, which fundamental facts ground causation. However, interventionists could claim that the solution to the NeoRussellian challenge is external to their semantic theory: that is, they could adopt the SM account for these purposes. So, the second option is viable but it also leads to a revised view of the metaphysical weight of the truth-conditions as provided by Woodward's theory.
I imagine that interventionists might even consider this fact to be a virtue of their theory.
Third Option: Roles and role-fillers. According to the Canberra plan, one can draw a distinction between conceptual roles and role-fillers (cf. Chalmers 1996 , Jackson 1998 . Is the third strategy convincing? The distinction between role and role-filler seems to establish a distinction between the conceptual and metaphysical questions. This is just what interventionists need. A framework in which such a distinction can be maintained is the methodological basis or precondition for interventionist neo-Russellians: only under the assumption that conceptual analysis and metaphysics are separable, interventionists can argue that conceptually non-reductive theories of causation are compatible with a metaphysics which does not take causation to be a fundamental feature of the world.
However, although the Canberra plan appears to be an attractive option, it suggests two amendments regarding the interventionist account. Firstly, this proposal has consequences for how interventionists describe their own theory: when they talk about providing an account of the meaning of causal claims they should restrict this talk to explicating the 'manipulability' feature of the conceptual role of causation. This project has to be distinguished from specifying the role-filler by proving an account of the mindindependent truth-makers for causal claims. This requires a change in the way interventionist describe the goal of their project, because Woodward often seems to be occupied with an account of truth-conditions and "modest realism" about truth-makers (Woodward 2003, 7-9, 122-124; 2008, 193-196) . However, Woodward could just accept that the relevant sense of 'meaning' he is interested in is an explication of the conceptual role.
Secondly and more importantly, it is a controversial matter whether the conceptual role of causation indeed picks out a role-filler as demanded by the Canberra plan ( 
Conclusion
In section 1, I started out with the neo-Russellian challenge. The main question in this paper was whether interventionists are able to take up the neo-Russellian challenge. In section 2, I discussed the open systems argument (OSA) that interventionists employ in order to meet the challenge. The result of the discussion was that the OSA is not sound.
Therefore, interventionists cannot meet the neo-Russellian challenge by using the OSA.
Section 3 explored a prima facie alternative for interventionists who wish to be neoRussellians: the SM account. In Section 4, I examined a problem for interventionists who want to adopt the SM account: interventionists cannot straightforwardly make use of the SM account because of the unclear relationship between the (non-reductive) semantics and the (reductive) neo-Russellian metaphysics. I considered three alternative views of this relationship. Two of these views appear to be viable for interventionist neo-Russellians (heavy-weight metaphysics and the Canberra plan). However, both views require revisions of some of the Woodward's intuitions about the nature of the meaning of causal claims.
Moreover, one view (the Canberra plan) is in substantial need of further arguments.
Where does this leave us with regard to the question whether interventionists are able to meet the neo-Russellian challenge? The overall result is that I can only draw a conditional conclusion: provided that interventionists find a way to separate analyzing concepts (and providing truth-conditions) from doing metaphysics, the SM account is an option for interventionists to respond to the neo-Russellian challenge. In other words, the burden of argument is shifted to the interventionists' side: it is a challenge -and by no means a hopeless one -for interventionists who want to be neo-Russellians to develop a lucid picture of how conceptual, semantic, and metaphysical matters relate according to their theory of causation. I believe that interventionists can only gain by pursuing this task.
